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NCO SELECTION AND TRAINING PROCEDURES OF THE SOVIET ARMY.(U)

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
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


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NCO SELECTION AND TRAINING PROCEDURES  
OF THE SOVIET ARMY.

LTC Jimmie L./Garrett  
1980

GARMISCH, GERMANY

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SELECTION AND TRAINING PROCEDURES

OF THE

SOVIET ARMY

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MAY 5 1981

Lieutenant Colonel Jimmie L. Garrett

Infantry

US Army Russian Institute

30 March 1980

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# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

U.S. ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

APO NEW YORK 09053

## FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of the overseas phase of training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgements and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, or the Russian Institute. The completed paper is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the Commander, US Army Russian Institute, APO New York 09053.

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### SUMMARY

Criticisms of the Soviet NCO-training process in Russian open-source articles display much concern over the lack of quality in this training, the frequent substitution of officers in NCO functionary roles, and dissatisfaction with the initial selection process of candidates for this training.

Upon arrival in his assigned unit, the NCO, normally 18-19 years old, has received six months of specialist training. His leadership training supposedly commences with practical work in his assigned unit. In reality, however, officers often give detailed orders to the squad members and use the squad leader to ensure that the orders are carried out. The conscript sergeant's problems are compounded by the fact that he is of the same age and, generally, of similar educational background as many of his squad members and, though he has had six months training, is inexperienced, especially in leadership fundamentals.

This paper concludes that Soviet NCOs are inefficiently trained, and ineffectively utilized; therefore, the NCO corps is the weakest link in the Soviet chain of command structure and a distinct liability to future military operations, at least in the opening stages of such operations.



## INTRODUCTION

Unlike Western armies which have large, well-established, standing, career-orientated, professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, relatively speaking, the Soviet Army has a small NCO corps and even smaller corps of career NCOs.\* Most Soviet NCOs serve only their initial obligated term of service, while only a few serve longer in an "extended service personnel" category. A lack of qualitative and quantitative NCO cadres has long plagued the Soviet Army. As in the Tsarist Imperial Army, relatively few NCOs re-enlist. Becoming an officer is accepted as an honorable career; but, serving voluntarily as a NCO or ordinary soldier has been out of favor with the Russian peasant ever since the landowner sent him into the army as a punishment or after drawing lots.

The difficulty in retaining NCO cadres is illustrated by the system of designating a portion of new inductees to attend NCO schooling. Graduates of such schools become junior sergeants and may theoretically become senior sergeants with as little as six months service as a sergeant. Only an additional six months service as a sergeant is required to attain the highest enlisted rank, that of senior sergeant (starshina).<sup>1</sup> Thus it is possible for an outstanding soldier to obtain the highest enlisted rank during his mandatory service. These conditions result in an inexperienced corps of NCOs and consequently denigrate the authority and respect in which that position is held among both officers and enlisted men. Additionally, those who have attained their highest possible rank early, long before their retirement age, can become a motivational problem to the Soviet Officer corps.

The qualitative problem, as Marshal Grechko, former Soviet Minister of Defense, and other Soviets have acknowledged, has forced a pressing need to develop junior cadres who combine the technical skills necessary to master the complex and constantly developing technology of modern warfare, with a level of general civilian education adequate to effectively conduct training of new recruits.<sup>2</sup> Under Soviet conditions this task is further complicated by the heavy emphasis on mandatory political training of all service members. NCOs receive essentially the same level of political training as do the rank and file. Warrant officers on the other hand are expected to undergo more intensive, somewhat higher level political training which should enable them to play an authoritative intermediate role in political instruction of enlisted personnel.<sup>3</sup>

Reasons for the difficulty in retaining qualified NCOs are not hard to find. Many, which are common to the armed forces of all developed countries, are amplified under Soviet conditions. Living and working conditions are severe, with a very high concentration of rigorous field training, often conducted under inhospitable conditions. This is magnified by the large contingents of Soviet troops manning remote border positions or garrisons in the Far North, Far East and Central Asia. Troops assigned to Warsaw Pact countries are garrisoned in isolated areas and are strictly forbidden from making unofficial contact with the local populace. Discipline is strict, often harsh and relations between officers and enlisted men frequently coarse; facts which even Soviet authorities seem to recognize as evidenced by numerous references to the need for greater courtesy and mutual respect within the military community.

\* Career NCOs in the Soviet Army fall into two categories: (1) Senior Sergeants (starshiny) or, (2) Warrant Officers (praporshchiki). See footnote 1 page 19 for a more detailed explanation.

A final important factor influencing retention is competition from the civil sector. Persons leaving the military upon completion of mandatory service have the right to return to their previous place and position of employment, or to re-enroll in the educational institution and for that course of instruction in which they were enrolled prior to induction.<sup>4</sup> Thus, persons approaching termination of mandatory service, who have good educational or employment prospects, have little economic incentive to remain on active duty in an enlisted status.

The pronounced militarization of Soviet society paradoxically also lends to the cadre retention problem. The competition between the two sectors for technically qualified personnel is often direct, in that the technical skills needed in the armed forces are frequently identical or closely related to skills needed in civilian industry. A skilled worker in civilian industry, or one possessing the prospects of becoming so skilled, particularly as his position is secure, will not easily be induced to choose a career as a military NCO.

In an attempt to gain a deeper insight into what goes into the composition of the Soviet Army's NCO Corps, this paper will examine how and when candidates are selected to become NCOs, how they are trained, and how effective this selection and training process is.

#### BACKGROUND

The personnel structure of the Soviet Army is based on a large corps of regular volunteer officers, assisted by a somewhat lesser number of regular NCOs, who together make up approximately one-third of the army's manpower. The other two-thirds are conscripts, inducted for 18 months or two years.<sup>5\*</sup>

At age 16, the young Soviet male citizen registers for the draft at the same time he applies for his internal passport and at age 18, he is ordered to report for conscription. Though universal military service is the law, exemption or deferment can be obtained for health or family reasons. Education deferments may also be granted. If this deferment extends beyond the age of 27, he is unlikely to be conscripted, but will serve his time in the reserves. Those conscripted will serve in various branches of either the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coastal Service, or Internal Security Forces.

Induction takes place in the spring and autumn of each year. After a brief equipping period, parades, and an impressive swearing-in ceremony, the conscripts are sorted and sent to units for their mandatory service. The Army sends those selected to be trained as junior NCOs directly to NCO training centers. After a six-month course, these men are sent out to units to serve as junior sergeants.

\* As of February 1977, draftees for the Soviet Army, coastal units, naval aviators, Border Guards, and Internal Security Forces have a 2-year obligation. Those draftees having a higher education have a 1½-year obligation. Seamen and Petty Officers who serve aboard ships, in coastal security forces, or as coastal border guards incur a 3-year commitment. Draftees in these units with a higher education have a 2-year obligation.

Conditions of service for the conscript are rigorous by modern Western standards. He gets little or no leave and receives a monthly salary of only 4-5 rubles. Moreover, the standards of food and accommodation are very low and even worse in the more remote areas, but probably better than that for the local populace as a whole in the remote regions. However, for the soldier who, in his second year of service, volunteers and is accepted for "extended service", life improves enormously. He then receives a wage equivalent to his civilian position, at least 30 days leave per year, and various fringe benefits such as subsidized shops and accommodations.

### SELECTION PROCESS

There are sixteen military districts in the USSR each of which receives a conscription quota from the Ministry of Defense for the semi-annual callups in May-June and November-December of each year. Subordinate to the military district is a system of draft boards called military commissariats, which are located in various civil jurisdictions. These areas are called the republic, the kray (territory) and oblast (region), the gorod (city) and the rayon (district). The military district commissariats are overall administrators of the system whereas those under them serve as both administrators and inductee collection points. The rayon areas serve as registration points and do the by-name drafting process. They also manage mobilization and reserve procedures. There are about 4700 military commissariat offices, of which at least 3600 are at the rayon level.<sup>6</sup>

From the collection points, inductees go directly to a training unit for a period of orientation, equipment issue, drill, and medical examinations. This training totals six weeks after which the Soviet military oath is administered amid much fanfare and celebration. Those selected for NCO training then depart for their special schools.

During the initial six-week training period, certain individuals are selected and sent to NCO schools prior to reporting to their parent units for their remaining active duty. Factors considered in the selection of candidates for NCO training include education level, technical skills, political reliability, physical condition, general intelligence, and personal conduct. Out of this selection process, the Soviet NCO corps usually contains a high percentage of Komsomol (Young Communist League) members.

On completion of this training, the trainee is promoted to junior sergeant and ordered to his unit. About 40% of the NCO strength is demobilized each year and is replaced by the newly graduated NCOs.<sup>7</sup>

Extended service personnel serve as senior sergeants. The term sverkhstrochniki (re-enlisted) also applies to those conscripts who choose to remain on active duty for one or more periods of extended service. The candidate for re-enlistment, who must have completed high school or its equivalent and not be over thirty-five years of age, may apply for extensions of two, four, or six years.<sup>8\*</sup> Acceptance is contingent upon the candidate's political

\* Those in this category who wish to remain in the service until the retirement age of 50 may do so, but must meet the existing acceptance criteria at each re-enlistment. The same service term extension options remain in effect.

reliability and military record. The screening board which decides to accept or reject the candidate is composed of the unit's political officer and the secretaries of the local Communist Party and Komsomol organizations. Final approval rests with the applicant's commanding officer. Former service personnel can also return to active duty under this program.

### NCO TRAINING

When selected to attend an NCO school, the inductee has received two of the three basic phases of Soviet military training. The three phases consist of (1) pre-induction training, which is the responsibility of the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF); (2) post-induction training, which is conducted at training unit centers over a six-week period just prior to the administration of the military oath; and (3) unit training, which is conducted in the parent unit to which the conscript is ultimately assigned.<sup>9</sup> For the NCO selectee, unit training is delayed until he has graduated from an NCO school, which is conducted by a specialized training unit.

In the pre-induction phase of training, DOSAAF organizations train the Soviet youth, usually age 16-18, in introductory military skills such as how to drive and repair vehicles and operate various communications equipment. The standard DOSAAF program provides for 140 hours of familiarization courses with military organizations and regulations, small arms use, and civil defense procedures. Some field exercises are conducted during voluntary summer camp programs.<sup>10</sup> DOSAAF also runs a large number of "clubs" with military-related activities, i.e. sky-diving, hunting, etc. The intent of this program is to substitute for basic training, which was received by recruits drafted prior to the 1967 Law on Universal Military Service.\*

A post-induction phase of training, as mentioned earlier, provides for a thorough medical examination, uniform and equipment issue, marching and drilling instructions, and a general introduction into the military way of life.<sup>11</sup> It is during this post-induction period of training that the screening boards select those destined for NCO schools. Commanders may select additional conscripts from their unit to be sent to NCO schools, if in their and another screening board's opinion, the conscript is highly qualified.

The newly selected NCO is then sent to one of the various branch-operated specialized schools instructing NCOs in military-technical skills pertinent to the branch specialty. These schools also provide training in physical education, political indoctrination, close-order drill, leadership, military regulations, chemical defense, field engineering, tactics, and nomenclature, assembly, disassembly, and maintenance of various weapons.<sup>12</sup> Due to the cyclical nature of the Soviet conscription process, most NCO training lasts for six months to allow for sufficient training time and to overlap personnel resources. Upon successful completion of this course, the candidate is promoted to junior sergeant and sent to join his parent unit.

\* Prior to 1967, draftees served one to two years longer than today's draftee. Basic training was an integral part of that longer term of service. With the shortened term of service, DOSAAF organizations were expanded and given the mission to provide military-orientated training in lieu of the basic training requirement.

As previously stated, the third phase of NCO training occurs in parent units and consist primarily of on-the-job-training (OJT) and the practical application of skills learned at the NCO course. In developing these skills, Soviet officers are expected to be cognizant of the intended role of an NCO. This role, as defined by Serzhanty i Starshiny Vooruzhennykh Sil SSR (Sergeants and Senior Sergeants of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union), is multifaceted. The NCO is responsible for training, indoctrination, military discipline, political and morale status, and the military bearing of his subordinates. He also carries a large part of the responsibility for proper use and care of weapons and equipment, and for his unit's successful accomplishment of combat missions.<sup>13</sup> The responsibilities of Soviet NCOs have increased markedly on the modern battlefield due to the potential of nuclear environment requirements and the likelihood of an increase in the number of independent, small-unit actions. "To accomplish this, exceptional vigor, audacity, and decisiveness is demanded to rapidly shift from fast-moving attack formations to a posture of stubborn defense while executing well-planned orders with creative ideas."<sup>14</sup>

The continuing emphasis being placed on developing NCO skills and their importance in the military collective is attested to by the numerous articles appearing in a variety of Soviet open-source military publications. The following quotes suggest the magnitude of the NCOs' importance in the Soviet Army:

Junior NCO personnel form the basis on which rests the entire matter of discipline, combat spirit and combat training of the unit ...<sup>15</sup>

Officers must be equally concerned for their NCOs' command and methodology training. The training and indoctrination of sergeants must be conducted so that they constantly expand their tactical horizons, become masters of combat employment of weapons and equipment, develop their command qualities and organizational abilities, master current methodology, knowledge and skills of military pedagogies and psychology, and perform their regulation duties competently and with initiative.<sup>16</sup>

And officers must remember that a commander of whatever rank is called upon not only to train and educate, but sometimes also to reeducate ... Without the help of sergeants, it is impossible to achieve any worthwhile success in the training and education of soldiers.<sup>17</sup>

Officers are reminded to remain aware of the fact that junior sergeants are their combat assistants and that unit combat readiness, status of order, efficiency, and military discipline depend upon the expertise of the NCO. "This obligates commanders, political officers, staff officers, and the Party and Komsomol organizations to show daily concern for NCO development and to skillfully train and indoctrinate them."<sup>18</sup>

In an article about airborne forces, one author wrote,

... it would be difficult to overestimate their (NCOs) role in the indoctrination and training of men ... Their job is such that they will frequently conduct small unit combat operations in the enemy's rear, and

sergeants will be in command. Not only the execution of the combat mission but the lives of comrades as well will depend on an NCO's initiative and his ability to function on his own.<sup>19</sup>

In continuing to emphasize the role of NCOs, another article observed that sergeants are the largest detachment of command cadres and the most closely tied with the individual soldier's life, routine, and training. Their level of training and their methodological and organizational skills largely determine the combat effectiveness and readiness of the military collective.<sup>20</sup> An important role in training and educating soldiers, as written in another article, belongs to the officers' closest assistant -- the sergeant. The success of the subunit in military and political training depends upon how the sergeants themselves are prepared for this and at what level their methodological skills lie.<sup>21</sup>

"Where the sergeants are well trained, where they are capable of making bold and competent tactical decisions and demonstrate resourcefulness, the subunit will always cope with the assigned mission."<sup>22</sup> In this article it was also emphasized that not only do the sergeants, along with the officers, have an important military role, they have an equally important role in the political indoctrination of the soldiers. They must "indoctrinate the soldiers in a spirit of patriotism and loyalty to their oath,"<sup>23</sup>

The previous articles have indicated how some Soviet officers view the importance of NCOs and their professional development, now how do the Soviet unit commanders accomplish this mission? Numerous Voyenny Vestnik (Military Herald), Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), and other open-source materials, using a "lessons-learned" type of format, described how "successful" units approached such training in the obvious hope of spreading to other units training ideas which have worked. It is from these types of articles that the following information has been taken.

In the Volga Military District, an artillery unit called their NCO training, "NCO Universities". Emphasis was placed on increasing the proficiency-level of how to teach classes. The author, a battery commander, believed that instructing the junior sergeants how to teach and how to prepare to teach would in turn develop in him a deeper understanding of the particular subject he had been given. This officer expected his NCOs to know how to do everything properly and quickly themselves, as well as how to organize "socialist competitions"\* among the soldiers to ensure maximum understanding of and participation in the class subject. The author gave advice on how to inject elements of rivalry and competition into training exercises, how to monitor the competition, and where to place special emphasis on a particular element of instruction and/or competition. Both the commander and the political officer spent an unusual amount of energy on constant attention to NCO instructional methods. Practical work was heavily emphasized after a theory class had been presented. The article pointed out that all of this unit's NCOs had received the badge of "Outstanding Member of the Soviet Union", which displayed their training excellence. The battery commander stated, "successful NCO performance of their duties and the daily growth of their mastery of methodological skills are

\* Competition instigated between subunits and units, rather than individuals, to force the soldier to understand that he is a "team" member and not an "individual" member. This type of competition also stresses the "hands-on" type of training currently used in the U.S. Army.

inseparably connected with the success of the battery, which occupies first place in socialist competition among subunits of the regiment and is confidently fulfilling the obligations assumed during the winter training period."<sup>24</sup>

In a similar approach, a senior lieutenant recognized that although his unit's NCOs had just graduated from a six-month school, they had not had time to digest all the material they had been exposed to and they had had little opportunity to put into practical application what they had learned. Therefore, his approach was, from the outset, to obtain a personal knowledge of his subordinates, their capabilities and their inclinations, civilian specialties, level of education, family status and so on. After an initial interview with the new junior sergeants, he would then assign them to a position, give them their first class to instruct, and assist them in preparing for the lesson by explaining in detail the subject matter and where available literature, material, and equipment needed for the class could be obtained. This officer believed that in-class competition, NCO preparation before class, and constant attention to NCO instructional techniques and subject knowledge were the best training combinations to achieve a high standard of NCO and troop proficiency while simultaneously maintaining a high state of combat readiness.<sup>25</sup>

A motorized rifle company commander explained that most of the work of training sergeants was performed by the company and platoon commanders. This mission was primarily accomplished by allowing the NCOs to teach classes. He felt that in preparing for a class, the NCO educated himself, gained verbal skills and became aware of the outstanding recruits in his unit as well as those who required additional work. This approach to NCO development, this commander believed, was the most efficient.<sup>26</sup>

Discipline and the manner in which he required his NCOs to enforce company policies and regulations were the key to a motorized rifle company commander's success. He stated that almost everything his unit accomplished depended on the lower level command personnel. "Above all an NCO must have a good idea of what he can demand from his unit members, know which ones are well-prepared and which ones are not, and the personal characteristics of each of his soldiers."<sup>27</sup> His method of training involved persuading the NCOs to understand that by bestowing favors on subordinates in an attempt to get them to respond properly and then attempt "to show enthusiasm for company disciplinary measures were incompatible traits for a true leader." In addition to this approach, the commander assigned a variety of work to his NCOs. He required each NCO to personally submit a daily report of recognitions and punishments each had awarded the previous day. During this time, the commander pointed out the NCO's shortcomings and deficiencies in each's educational and pedagogical work. This officer required his NCOs to take action on every deficiency made by his subordinates and that any necessary action was taken independently and promptly without an officer's prompting.<sup>28</sup>

A signal training platoon commander's approach to training NCOs was to initially allot a considerable part of his time working with the squad commanders. During this time, he explained to each sergeant what his job was to be, how important his and the soldiers' discipline was to the unit, and that he should always present an example to be emulated by his soldiers. This officer realized that although there were some NCOs with natural leadership ability, most had to have this ability instilled in them. He concluded that to obtain the best results, an officer had to personally get to know his NCOs and had to make use of each individual's strong qualities to achieve improvement in a squad's progress and discipline.<sup>29</sup>

An article concerning the training results of a motorized rifle company focused its attention on the contributions to NCO training by Komsomol assistants in the unit. The concluding statement was, "All our NCOs are experts in their jobs. Moreover, they are Komsomol activists and work with vigor!"<sup>30</sup>

In an airborne regiment, one company began requiring officers to make a more earnest attempt at developing NCOs to act more independently. When they received a new group of NCO graduates from training units, they spent a week checking their training level in all of the main areas. These results were then used in assigning them to their positions and for determining subsequent additional work with the sergeants. Every Monday, they scheduled a "Sergeants' Day" during which special classes were held designed to improve the NCOs' methodological skills and to improve their pedagogical skills as indoctrinators. These classes were taught by company officers and continued throughout the training cycle. Field exercises were used to refine the techniques taught in classrooms.<sup>31</sup>

A colonel wrote,

The store of knowledge and skills (the new NCOs) have acquired in the training process is only the foundation for developing the necessary skills. It is only in practice, in fulfilling various operational training missions, and in giving constant assistance to officers that it is possible to develop such qualities as, for example, exactingness, independence, and the ability to rely on the Komsomol activists of one's subunit or organized competition among subordinates in working norms and training tasks. The Internal Service Regulations obligate the squad commander to instill in soldiers a love for the service and a thrifty attitude toward weapons and communications gear.<sup>32</sup>

He frankly admitted that no matter how extensive the program of NCO training units may be, not everyone succeeded in assimilating the multifaceted activities of the junior sergeant with sufficient depth and thoroughness in such a short time. Therefore, not only must NCO training continue in units, special classes were required to help accelerate the development of junior sergeants. This supplementary training should be taught by the officers. In his unit special classes were organized for the recent NCO graduates before the beginning of a training cycle. These classes were conducted to familiarize the young sergeants with the specific nature and peculiarities of their units. This time was also used for commanders to acquaint themselves with the personal qualities of each junior sergeant. The colonel stated that an important event for the newly-arrived NCOs was their first meeting with the unit in which they would be serving. One of his best company commanders informed these men of the unit history, traditions, the socialist pledges made by the unit, the progress toward the fulfillment of these pledges, and introduced Komsomol members. These activities occurred in the unit's Lenin Room where the graduates in turn introduced themselves, and mentioned any Komsomol activities or units in which they had participated. The colonel wrote that in the NCO training units, the sergeants received only the fundamentals of command knowledge and skills, and that only in the daily work routine with subordinates where the NCO is personally responsible, could the development of a junior sergeant actually occur. Therefore, one must train patiently and painstakingly, and place



demands on each NCO based on his individual peculiarities. As experience shows, the colonel explained, success is achieved by those supervisors who, in working with their NCOs, are able to see each of them as individuals. He also emphasized that the ability to teach is the most important quality to be learned by both the NCO and the officer. The NCO must be armed with knowledge and skills, and since one can only pass on what he himself knows, the need for methodological skills is obvious. This colonel also required officer-NCO tactical classes before all field exercises.<sup>33</sup>

In an editorial article, the fact that NCO graduates continued their practical command development in their individual units was affirmed. Therefore, the article continued, it is of critical importance that the newly-arrived NCOs are quickly settled in their new locations so they can begin to perform their duties. An example was cited of a unit in the Carpathian Military District where officers greet the newly-arrived NCOs "warmly" and begin immediately to familiarize the recent graduates with the local area, unit history and traditions, achievements in field and political training, and unit missions. Then the NCOs are introduced to a training methods course, where they are also shown the combat and political training facilities. They are then required to study equipment and weapons after which they receive uniform guidelines of methods to be used in conducting classes in tactics, technical problems, weapons, drill, physical training, and military regulations. After these courses, the article reported, most of the NCOs confidently take their "first steps as commanders."<sup>34</sup>

Another key feature in this unit was a weekly "NCO Day" where command and instructional method classes were held at the company and battery level and specialists from outside the unit were brought in to instruct on a particular specialty. Command training topics were also discussed. The sergeants benefit greatly from these briefings for upcoming classes and from exchanging mutual training and indoctrination experiences. The article cited how one motorized rifle company commander managed his "NCO Day". In command classes on tactical, reconnaissance, and weapons training, this commander required the junior sergeants to study the fundamentals of squad and platoon combat actions. In this way, they learned to skillfully observe the enemy, competently estimate the situation, precisely control squad fires in the attack and on the defense, make firm decisions, and execute them decisively. Instructional methods were also presented. Commanders, political officers, Party and Komsomol organizations constantly provided the junior sergeants with political knowledge to ensure the NCOs have the appropriate information with which to indoctrinate their subordinates in a spirit of "utter devotion to the ideals of communism" and allegiance to military duties and the military oath. This is accomplished during political classes, and the "patient teaching to be sure that everyone has a correct understanding of the Party's domestic and foreign policies, is an active political fighter, strictly fulfills the norms and principles of communist morality, and displays vigilance."<sup>35</sup> Socialist competition is stressed to ensure maximum participation and which serves to raise the quality of combat and political training of the soldiers. The article concluded by pointing out that junior sergeants are officers' combat assistants and that unit readiness, equipment serviceability, unit discipline, and combat preparedness depend on the sergeants' expertise. This in turn obligates commanders, political officers, staff officers, and the Party and Komsomol organizations to express daily concern for NCO development and to skillfully train and indoctrinate them.<sup>36</sup>

The preceding accounts describe how some Soviet units with high success ratings perform their NCO-training mission. Apparently, the Soviet Army has no formal army-wide unit master plan in which specific NCO training goals are established nor specific standards adopted. However, general goals such as expecting NCOs to be able to instruct soldiers in various military and political subjects, developing NCO command qualities, and gaining increased military proficiency of knowledge learned during NCO courses at the unit level through practical application of those skills, are fixed. Thus lower level units seem to have the authority to form their own methods of development and utilization of their sergeants.

Of the units labelled "successful" by the Soviet authors in the articles reviewed for this paper, all seem to have the following in common: officers took personal control of training NCOs; the best results were achieved when officers interacted individually with the recently-promoted sergeant; methodological and pedagogical skills were the most critical skills each unit wanted its NCOs to possess; weekly "NCO Days" were activities most productive to separating NCOs for specialty training and mutual exchanges of experience; NCOs were taught to enforce army regulations without an officer's assistance; political awareness and political conscientiousness were heavily emphasized; and, "socialist competition" was a method of training which must be understood by instructors and used in all appropriate classes. The successful unit officers believe that for NCOs to become competent instructors it is not only desirable that they do most of the instructing, but, that it is during the preparation and study time allotted for these classes where an NCO will learn the detailed knowledge of a subject that will improve his military proficiency. In other words, self-study and self-education is perhaps the key to Soviet unit OJT programs which purport to train and educate an NCO in his appropriate military skill level.

How effective these programs are is the subject of the next section of this paper.

#### DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN TRAINING NCOS

The criticisms and deficiencies noted, as in preceding sections, were extracted from articles written during the 1970s by Soviet authors. Although some articles overlap causing their subjects to be intermingled, generally this section is organized into the major categories of NCO selection process, NCO substitution by officers, NCO training quality in both the specialized training units and parent units, and NCO disciplinary problems. It should be remembered that these criticisms are those identified by Soviet officers themselves.

The selection of an NCO candidate from a unit rather than during the post-induction phase was experienced by a senior lieutenant who observed that his unit had made a mistake in assessing a soldier's qualities and had mistakenly sent him to NCO school. He had initially singled the soldier out for his appearance; "his face was strong-willed", and he gave commands in a "firm, resounding voice". But he turned out to lack zeal in his work and showed a tendency toward the demonstrative side of things, or, as the lieutenant wrote, "he liked to put up a smoke screen". Having discovered this trait too late to keep this soldier from becoming an NCO, the unit shunted him aside to meaningless tasks. The lesson the lieutenant learned, and the advice he gave to others, was to take more time and individual attention in selecting soldiers to become NCOs.<sup>37</sup>

A lead article in Voyennyy Vestnik explained that formalism still had not been eliminated in some places. For example, some military commissariats consider a draftee's high level of general education to be the primary and almost sole criterion for qualifying him as an NCO selectee. Experience has shown that in addition to education, DOSAAF military training in good units and the displays of organizational ability during this training are other positive qualifications for a draftee to be selected for NCO training. This article complained that some companies and batteries work spastically, "in fits and starts", with their junior sergeants and rarely hold command classes with them. As a result, NCOs develop their professional skills slowly. Trust is cited as being very important, but not all commanders show trust toward their assistants. At times platoon commanders "shackle the sergeants' initiative and coddle or even substitute for them."<sup>33</sup> Some platoon and company commanders are not yet duly persistent in instilling "exactingness" and principle in their assistants. "Therefore we still encounter NCOs who are demanding exactingness of subordinates only in an officer's presence. But the latter only has to leave the area for the NCOs to dissolve in the general mass of soldiers as if they do not notice that the privates are violating the uniform regulations, the order of the day and so on."<sup>39</sup>

Colonel General Merimskiy, Deputy Chief of the Main Administration for Combat Training, Soviet Ground Forces, wrote that the problem of producing sergeants, "the most numerous detachment of command personnel", has always been urgent. He said that although the system for training NCOs is soundly based on past experience, and that although most NCOs are well-equipped to do their jobs, the system is not being completely utilized everywhere. It starts at the initial NCO selection process whereby sound judgement is not always exercised in selecting NCO candidates. It is mandatory that representatives of the training units participate in the work of the commissions which select the candidate for these units. This will improve the quality of selection."<sup>40</sup> He suggested a second addition to this process, in that a longer period should evolve before selecting NCO candidates in order to allow the officers of the post-induction training units additional time to observe and analyze which of the new recruits possessed the necessary qualities to become a competent NCO. He stated, "Naturally, this method of selection will require the introduction of several adjustments in the existing training programs." He further observed that some commanders of NCO training units do not always heed the recommendations of current methodology and military pedagogy and psychology. In addition, training programs and lesson plans are not always followed as prescribed by regulations nor are training materials and facilities utilized properly. He cited a particular instance where an instructor used a simulated vehicle while the actual vehicle dedicated for this purpose was parked nearby and not used. Frequently, students miss large portions of classes because they are involved in various types of administrative work.

In analyzing these problems, Merimskiy said: "Errors in organizing lessons, the poor methodological training of individual officers, and the insufficient monitoring by senior commanders allow some graduates of training units to inadequately master the program material, to be unable to acquire a firm grasp of mission assignment to subordinates or in controlling them and their fire in the course of battle, and to be ill-prepared to provide an exemplary equipment and armament class demonstration."<sup>41</sup> Merimskiy recommended that NCO classes in parent units should be conducted no higher than at company or battalion level, as this will significantly shorten the separation of NCOs and officers from their units. He emphasized the importance of units having

special rooms set aside where regulations, training literature, and methodological elaborations are collected in sufficient quantity. Confidence in oneself is of vital importance in eliminating "petty tutelage and substitution." If the sergeants are not required to accomplish their work completely, this engenders lack of confidence in their ability to perform and undermines their authority. Merimskiy further recommended that participation in Komsomol activities assists the NCOs in mastering the principles of military pedagogy and psychology. This participation also assists the NCO in acquiring organizational skills in training and indoctrinational work with subordinates. Merimskiy concluded his article with the point that "the command development of sergeants, increasing their ideological-political tempering, and the improvement of organizational skills in each troop collective must be the most important concern of commanders, political organs, staffs, and Party and Komsomol organizations."<sup>42</sup>

The second category, that of officers supplanting NCOs, is criticized by a colonel who wrote.

"It is difficult to overestimate the significance of individual work in the development of junior sergeants. Unfortunately, it is often expressed in ordinary coddling, where individual officers substitute for the sergeants even in petty things, thus stifling their initiative and independence."<sup>43</sup>

An editorial in Krasnaya Zvezda noted that the newspaper had received several letters of complaints about a particular unit's commander flagrantly ordering officers to replace NCOs in his subunits. As a result of the complaints, several officers' calls were held to resolve the issue. The article concluded that this particular unit was then complying with general military regulations on this subject, but by implication the commander was highly dissatisfied with his NCOs.<sup>44</sup>

An article concerned with an airborne regiment took a company commander to task for frequently substituting officers in sergeants' duties and for the fact that this unit showed no particular concern for NCO prestige. This company commander had a platoon commander whom he allowed to "dress-down" NCOs in front of his platoon. Instead of correcting the officer, the commander himself frequently shouted at sergeants and treated them crudely. This commander was transferred from the unit. The article further reported that training is not well-balanced in some of the regimental subunits. Certain officers regarded a sergeant only as a commander in charge of a section in combat. They had forgotten about the sergeant-indoctrinator task. Some officers had assumed all of the indoctrinational functions themselves, substituting for the sergeants in both large and small matters. All of this ultimately affects military discipline. The article asked,

Why is it so difficult to root out the practice of substituting for sergeants? After all, the damage caused by this is discussed at almost every meeting in the regiment. We do not have to go far for the answer. When the officers encounter difficulties, they understand that it is more difficult to teach a sergeant pedagogical skills than it is to train him in a specialty and that it requires a great deal of time.<sup>45</sup>

The article continued by reporting that some officers take what appears to be the easiest way out by doing themselves what the junior sergeant is supposed to do. The sergeant then becomes accustomed to having an officer supplant him, loses his sense of position and then becomes disenchanted in working with his men.<sup>46</sup>

The quality of NCO training, although addressed by almost all of the articles used, is specifically addressed in the following paragraphs.

An inspecting officer wrote that in certain places, little attention is paid to training sergeants, and particularly to instilling training methodological skills, and to working out training projects with respect to training materials. Additionally, field exercises with sergeants are frequently replaced by classroom instruction, training sessions become merely a study of theoretical concepts, and training locations are usually prepared haphazardly by supervisors.<sup>47</sup>

In the Northern Group of Forces a captain wrote of the poor quality of training activities and unused socialist competition opportunities. A tank company commander had not found time to instruct his sergeants, or to advise them on how to organize competition for tank crew members at various training stations, nor about how to put together outline schedules. Therefore, poor training resulted because the sergeants were poorly prepared. The writer said, "obviously the requisite organizational qualities do not come spontaneously to the sergeants ... Organization of socialist competition is an innovative business, and sergeants must be taught constantly."<sup>48</sup> The author went on to say if a commander forgets it is his and his platoon commanders' duties to constantly reinforce this knowledge, an immediate impact is shown in the quality of training.

An engineering lieutenant general wrote a very detailed article outlining engineer training and specialty requirements, which identified several areas where more work had to be done in developing sergeants' command qualities. He observed that the development and maturing of the sergeant as a combat NCO comes about in daily military activity, in field exercises, and on maneuvers. It is only in these types of activities that the necessary command qualities are uncovered and developed to their fullest potential. He stated that, "it is very important to make the sergeant understand from the very first day that he occupies a position in which he has adequate knowledge and is endowed with definite rights. He must now answer not only for himself, but also for the personnel entrusted to him: he is the first-line commander to whom the soldier turns immediately."<sup>49</sup> It is in this period that NCOs should be dealt with both tactfully and attentively, and not "picked on for trifles" nor placed into very complicated situations. Their work should be constantly supervised, but "trust must be unfailingly linked to great exactingness." A young sergeant may make mistakes, but "sharp criticism and a harsh tone may forever destroy his willingness to undertake independent actions." The general concluded his article with some words of advice:

"Cultivating independence in NCOs is a complex and exacting task. For this purpose officers must entrust important and serious missions to their assistants, they must be forced to take action in such combat simulated situations as being cut off from other detachments. Officers should always be ready to come to their aid, tactfully, and should not be so quick to step in for an NCO. Nothing trains a sergeant like the personal example of the commander."<sup>50</sup>

Marshal of Engineer Troops Kharchenko supported the preceeding engineer lieutenant general's points and added a few other criticisms himself. In a recent field exercise, Kharchenko noticed the sergeants were acting indecisively and languidly. "And the reason was that the sergeants had been ignored, commander training with them was irregularly held, and instructional-methodology exercises were poorly organized." He went on to say that certain officers strive to assume the leadership of everything, large or small. They show excessive concern for the smallest detail, they command the individual soldiers, they suggest ready-made decisions to the sergeant, and they attempt to be everywhere and try to do everything themselves. The Marshal emphasized that one individual cannot cope with everything, especially in a fast-moving, dynamic combat situation. "It is even more difficult for those officers who have at their disposal a large number of varied engineer vehicles." The commander of such units, no matter how hard he tries, is incapable of devoting "identical attention" to each crew. Therefore, Kharchenko asserted, the commander must painstakingly and thoroughly train his NCOs so that he can rely on them to do their job and the officer, his. To assist in training the NCO to carry out his prescribed missions, "what should be predominant at exercises is not so much theoretical testing and general discussions", but actual practical work from which the NCO can gain valuable experience.

The Marshal continued by stressing the importance of having junior sergeants "firmly trained" in guiding squads, gun crews, and tank crews by experiences gained during numerous practical field exercises. Kharchenko complained that usually a unit will operate from the beginning of an exercise to the end at full strength, without simulating any battle losses. "Are we to believe that that's how it will be in actual combat? It is absolutely necessary to create elements of surprise, to make simulated casualties, to destroy technical equipment, to force the sergeants to continue the execution of a task with incomplete crews, equipment, or vehicles." He was prepared to accept the result that this type of training would slow down the field training exercise, but at least these types of problems would not be ignored. The Marshal went on to cite some of the specific missions engineers must be thoroughly trained for, and that this expertise cannot be gained simply through discussions, "but must be developed by practical training, and through one's personal example."<sup>51</sup>

Discipline, the final category, relates not only to the individual NCO's discipline but to the resultant discipline of the unit and its subordinates. A Znamenets article about training NCOs in how to administer discipline pointed out that "inexperienced NCOs frequently avoid solving critical problems involving discipline; they appeal to the orders of a senior commander and act in his name, or they turn to other authorities for assistance."<sup>52</sup>

In an article about relying on sergeants, a Guards' colonel began with the importance of an NCO; he described how a soldier's entire life falls within the purview of an NCO; he mentioned that the "solidarity of the military collective, its moral micro-climate, and successes in military training depend for the most part on sergeants and on the level of their training, methodological expertise, activeness, initiative and inter-relations with subordinates." He continued by pointing out that from his many years of experience, junior sergeants will attain successful accomplishment of their duties wherever officers know how to rely on sergeants, have confidence in them, and express daily concern for their education. He then stated that "it is very regretful that so far not all officers show sufficient concern for the education" of junior sergeants nor for increasing their authority. He then cited a

particular battalion which had a number of substantial training deficiencies and frequently failed to accomplish internal duty details. Upon seeking out the cause of this, it was uncovered that the battalion commander was singling out numerous sergeants for disciplinary action. "It transpired that the role of the junior sergeants was underrated in the battalion, and a proper concern for their education had not been manifested." Continuing to investigate, the colonel talked with several of the battalion officers and received such answers as, "when you do something yourself, it's more reliable." The colonel said that he then became "convinced that this type of reasoning was the cause for this battalion's poor utilization of NCOs." The officer concluded that, "Alas, one officer alone, no matter how experienced and trained he might be, cannot personally influence all of his subordinates. But if"... sergeants are delegated their proper duties and responsibilities, then things would immediately become different." Many officers in this same unit complained that the training units were not accomplishing their tasks of training NCOs. The colonel's closing statement emphasized "the true guarantee that junior sergeants will provide reliable support for officers and warrant officers in solving the problems of improving the quality and effectiveness of combat training and educating personnel is achieved by working with each sergeant continuously and painstakingly, and in close contact with Party and Komsomol organizations."<sup>53</sup>

In perhaps the most thorough and detailed of all the articles reviewed for this paper, Colonel General Salmanov criticized NCO training approaches and methods used in both the NCO schools and those in some units. In training units, he mentioned that not all were using training material and facilities as efficiently as they should. As a result, the established training goals were not being fully attained. "The training facilities and technical training equipment, including simulators and training films, are not used effectively. Often a story or explanation predominates in practical classes rather than requiring actual performance by students. Officers and sergeants often overlook mistakes in students' actions and do not seek to eliminate them in the course of classes."<sup>54</sup> There are instances of grade inflation of trainees' knowledge and skills." Another criticism of the NCO training unit noted was that candidates are not properly taught how to organize or set up socialist competition classes nor are they taught how to determine whether or not a soldier has fully measured up to what he was expected to learn from a particular class. This deficiency particularly stands out when, after becoming sergeants, many of them experience serious difficulties in training and indoctrinating subordinates. In some parent units, junior sergeants are not being given precise recommendations as to how to organize classes, which training facilities are available, or how to establish socialist competition by topics, training tasks, or norms. In some classes, sergeants of several unrelated specialities are being placed in the same training group thereby restricting the classes to one of a general nature rather than an in-depth study of a particular specialty.

Salmanov reported that there are frequent instances where sergeants are withdrawn from class preparation time by various types of urgent or routine administrative requirements and are not given an opportunity to prepare for their assigned classes, which in turn creates a negative effect on both the sergeants' ability to teach and on the soldiers to whom the class is presented. Salmanov believed that commanders and staff officers must "constantly focus their attention on the independent work of sergeants" and assist them in this preparation. The author further emphasized that more expertise must be developed in how to organize socialist competition in training. Sergeants "must not only be given concrete recommendations for working scheduled material in all instructional techniques classes and briefings, but they must patiently

be taught the art of day-to-day management of competition. They must have a precise picture of how best to construct practices in fulfilling norms and tasks and to create an atmosphere of competitiveness and accurate struggle for first place."<sup>55</sup>

Salmanov complained that there were still frequent occurrences of officers replacing NCOs in their jobs. This, he said, leads to an overload on the officers, and as the NCOs lose opportunities to develop their command skills, they become accustomed to looking around for their superiors, thereby losing the respect of their subordinates. "Commanders, political workers, staff officers and Party organizations must resolutely uproot this work style."

Tactlessness and rudeness are two mannerisms which NCOs must be taught to overcome and not to display to their subordinates as "the young soldier is easily injured when he has not yet been drawn into the strenuous rhythm of army life." He further pointed out that NCO training should not be placed into the hands of newly-commissioned officers as they have "insufficient experience in managing military collectives or in organizing NCOs' command training." Salmanov concluded, as the other articles have, that "commanders, political workers, staff officers and Party and Komsomol organizations must show daily concern for the training of sergeants on whom the effectiveness of the training and indoctrination process depends."<sup>56</sup>

In the articles presented in this section, each began with the observation that most units had excellent training programs and were developing highly professional NCOs. After establishing this fact, the articles then proceeded to point out areas which required the continuous and daily attention of the chain of command and the political organizations. The major criticisms were: (1) NCO candidate selection procedures need improvement; (2) the initial reception of recently-promoted NCOs in their parent units were being unevenly and poorly managed; (3) officers were frequently supplanting NCOs; (4) NCOs were reacting to this dilemma by waiting for officers' detailed instructions; (5) unit discipline and the chain of command structure was thereby weakened; (6) NCO training units and unit training programs were failing to teach NCOs how to prepare and organize their classes, how to teach effectively, and how to use socialist competition in their classes; (7) "NCO Days" were not being effectively nor efficiently utilized; and, (8) actual combat situations were not being adequately reflected in field training exercises.

### CONCLUSION

The selection of candidates for NCO training falls primarily within the purview of the post-induction training units. Individual candidate qualifications for selection mainly include education level, technical skills, and political reliability. There was no evidence found to substantiate the hypothesis that family or personal relationships with draft-board members ensured selection for NCO training. If this personal approach exists, it is probably on a minor scale as the position of NCO in either the Tsarist or Soviet systems was not a goal of those seeking privileged status. Being an NCO has traditionally entailed considerable responsibilities without adequate compensatory rewards.

Many Soviet commanders are dissatisfied with the selection procedures used by the military commissariats and believe this process should be drastically improved. According to them candidate selection should involve more than



solely the statistical credentials possessed by a selectee. These Soviet officers realize that any change in this system would require considerable alteration in the bureaucratic machinery which handles this selection process and consequently, the chances for such action in the near future appear remote.

The results of the NCO training units seem to portray an uneven quality of academic accomplishments. This may stem from supervisor pressure or the demands of performance parameters which encourage training cadres to inflate grades and pad exercise results in the interest of making themselves or the organization look good. The regional organizational structure of the system may also preclude uniformity. Yet, this short, intensive NCO course does lay the foundation to be built on by line units. The basic instruction received in military subjects places the graduates far ahead in military skills of those who have not attended an NCO school.

Additional NCO instruction to further refine and perfect knowledge of military subjects as well as to receive practical training in leadership techniques are being erratically accomplished in the units themselves. The constant exhortations of the articles presented in this paper leave no doubt that commanders, political officers, Party and Komsomol organizations should keep the training of NCOs high in their priorities. (Other articles exhort these same officers to have other "uppermost" priorities.) But unit programs do not appear to be formal or structured. Therefore, unevenness in the quality and proficiency of Soviet NCOs is to be expected.

Certainly, there are good units and less effective or less well trained units in the Soviet Army as there are in other armies throughout the world. But, the drain on the available time of an already overworked officer corps becomes readily apparent when it is realized that at the unit level which is responsible for training NCOs, these same officers are also responsible for other typical unit missions, i.e. combat training and readiness, maintenance of equipment, recruit training, unit administration, etc. To provide individual time to counsel each NCO, teach him how to teach, supervise his instruction, and accomplish his other missions as well, is a major task indeed. In addition to this full schedule, the Soviet officer is expected to meet Party obligations and continue with a rigorous self-improvement and self-education program. Thus, the responsibility to train and develop NCOs who have only an additional six months of training more than the raw recruits, places an immense burden on unit officers.

It is understandable to see how the conclusion can be drawn that if an NCO is to develop his professional knowledge, he has to primarily develop through self-education and a strong desire for self-improvement. This type of initiative, however, while perhaps regarded as a virtue, in fact does not take place very often. One of the reasons being, as previously stated, that increased responsibilities are not sufficiently balanced by appropriate incentives. Therefore, competent, professional NCOs are bound to exist only in severely limited numbers throughout the Soviet Army.

As stated several times earlier, Soviet officers frequently take over an NCO's responsibility whenever they want to ensure job accomplishment. This does, however, have its adverse effect on both the NCO and the soldier. The recently-promoted NCO is approximately the same age as the soldier and has only six additional months of training to fall back on. If his officers do not train him to perform well nor support him in his position, not only does the NCO keep expecting the officer to do the NCO's job, the soldiers in the ranks

also look for guidance and direction from the officers and may entirely disregard the NCO. This, of course, weakens the chain of command structure wherever an NCO interfaces with the system.

This lack of adequate NCO training further raises the question of how this type of training copes with the increasingly technologically-orientated improvement in weaponry, communications, and rapid mobility advancements. Will the Soviets be forced to increase the number of officers at the lower levels to ensure the absorption and effective employment of a greater degree of sophisticated material? How effective will this employment be if they do not? It is known that the more technically-demanding services receive preferential selection of those draftees possessing the highest IQs and/or display above average mechanical skills. Where does this leave the combat arms? In the absence of an officer in a combat situation, Soviet NCOs may well display timely initiative and decisiveness on the battlefield and act appropriately, but a combination of their lack of training and experience, at least in the early stages of war, coupled with disregard for an NCO in the chain of command may well find his effectiveness greatly impaired and paralyze his capability to act decisively. However, as a former NCO defector reported, to disobey a NCO's instructions during field exercises or in wartime is a violation of military regulations and subject to severe penalties. Although penalties do exist for such violations, this may not be a strong enough deterrent to those enlisted men who in peacetime are trained to act one way and then must radically adjust their attitudes and actions in wartime.

In conclusion, the Soviet NCO corps is the weakest link in the Soviet chain of command structure. The Soviet NCO is almost exclusively orientated toward a two-year term of service. He is undertrained and poorly motivated to become more proficient due to a lack of professional and career incentives. The Soviet NCO corps as a whole, is far removed from Western armies' concepts of the NCO role, status, and career outlook, except for those few who elect to continue on in their service as praporshchiks. They do, however, possess the same devotion to their Motherland, willingness to accept great sacrifices, capacity to absorb great tragedies, and continue on as did their World War II predecessors. While these personal characteristics are admirable and should not be discounted, it can be said that Soviet NCO training techniques are only marginally effective. In addition, poor NCO utilization in units and lack of emphasis on further NCO-orientated training and development promises an NCO corps that is inefficient, ineffective, and a distinct liability in the initial stages of future military operations.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Poleznyye Sovety Voynu, (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1975), p.10. The title starshina refers to both the highest enlisted rank, and in this context is usually translated "master sergeant", and to what has been the highest enlisted position in a company, here translatable as company first sergeant. Since the inception of the praporshchik program, both praporshchiks and NCOs have occupied the position of "first sergeant".

In Paul Mitchell's USARI student research report in 1976 (listed in this bibliography), he described the praporshchiks as follows:

The praporshchik rank classification was created in 1971 in an attempt to develop a professional NCO cadre corps prepared to serve for an extended period of time. Its ranks are filled primarily from among soldiers just completing mandatory service, supplemented by returnees from the reserves. They are selected from among the best NCOs with priority going to those having general or specialized secondary education. (p.5).

UTILIZATION: There are five categories of praporshchiks: platoon commanders, company first sergeants, technicians of various types, non-technically qualified specialists, and political workers. The position of platoon commander is considered an "officer's duty" and is the highest level of authority to which these ranks are normally assigned. Those who are platoon leaders are largely former career enlisted men. The position of starshina, or company first sergeant, seems to have become, for praporshchiks of the "command cadre" category, an intermediate position for the second rank, behind the more experienced group occupying positions of platoon commander. (p.21).

<sup>2</sup> Marshal A.A. Grechko, Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva, (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1974), pp.223-224.

<sup>3</sup> F. Fedchenko, "Na Politzanyatiyakh s Serzhantami", Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 19 (1973), p.63.

<sup>4</sup> Poleznyye, p.19.

<sup>5</sup> Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR, ot 12 October 1967-Zakon "O Vseobshchey Voinskoy Obyazannosti." Ot 25 February 1977, O Vnesenii Nekotorykh Izmeneniy v Zakon SSSR, "O Vseobshchey Voinskoy Obyazannosti."

<sup>6</sup> Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, DIA publication, (Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1978), p.5-2.

<sup>7</sup> The Soviet Soldier, USAREUR PAMPHLET 30-60-10, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 24 June 1974), p.17.

<sup>8</sup> Herbert Goldhamer, Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1974), p.5.

- <sup>9</sup>USAICS HANDBOOK ON THE Soviet Ground Forces (Revised), US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Az., (Washington: Government Printing Office, July 1977), pp.2-3 - 2-5.
- <sup>10</sup>DIA Handbook, p.6-2.
- <sup>11</sup>USAICS, p.2-5.
- <sup>12</sup>"Serzhanty: Boyevyye Pomoshchniki Ofitserov", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 8 (1978), p.3.
- <sup>13</sup>G.V. Sredina, (ed.), Serzhanty i Starshiny Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR, (Moskva: Ministerstvo Oborony, 1973), pp.23-27.
- <sup>14</sup>Ibid., p.24.
- <sup>15</sup>"Serzhanty: Boyevyye", p.2.
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid., p.3.
- <sup>17</sup>LT GEN D. Abashin, "Serzhantam -Komandirskiye Kachestva", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 4, April 1975, p.102.
- <sup>18</sup>"Serzhanty: Boyevyye", p.5.
- <sup>19</sup>Guards LTC R. Magomedov, "Ne Podmenyat' - Pomogat'", Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 January 1979, p.2.
- <sup>20</sup>COL M Dernovoy, "Puti Stanovleniya Serzhantov", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 11 (1976), p.98.
- <sup>21</sup>MAJ V. Novitskiy, "Uchim Serzhantov Mastirstvu", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 11 (1976), p.67.
- <sup>22</sup>Senior Lieutenant A. Maksyuta, "Serzhantami Stanovyatsya v Stroyu", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 1 (1976), p.61.
- <sup>23</sup>Ibid., p.63.
- <sup>24</sup>COL I. Maksimov, "Serzhantskiye Universitety", Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 March 1978, p.1.
- <sup>25</sup>Senior Lieutenant A. Avramenko, "Uchim Budushchikh Serzhantov", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 8 (1976), pp.85-87.
- <sup>26</sup>Maksyuta, pp.61-63.

- <sup>27</sup> MAJ G. Aksenov, "Komandiri Distsiplina Avtoritet Serzhanta", Znamenosets, No. 7 (July 1978), p.36.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., p.37.
- <sup>29</sup> LT L. Naynushin, "Povyshayem Trebovatel'nost' k Serzhantom", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 5 (1977), p.74.
- <sup>30</sup> CPT A. Nekrylov, "U Initsiatorov Sorevnovaniya", Sovetskiy Voin, No. 16 (August 1978), p.12.
- <sup>31</sup> Magomedov, p.2.
- <sup>32</sup> Dernovoy, p.98.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp.98-101.
- <sup>34</sup> "Serzhanty: Boyevyye", p.3.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., p.4.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., p.5.
- <sup>37</sup> Senior Lieutenant A. Tvoronovich, "Luchshe Izuchat' Podchinennykh: Urok", Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 June 1978, p.2.
- <sup>38</sup> "Serzhanty: Boyevyye", p.4.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., p.5.
- <sup>40</sup> COL GEN V. Merimskiy, "Stanovleniye Serzhantov", Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 April 1978, p.2.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>43</sup> Dernovoy, p.98.
- <sup>44</sup> "Serzhanty i Ustavnoi Poryadok", Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 October 1978, p.2.
- <sup>45</sup> Magomedov, p.2.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>47</sup> Novitskiy, p.67.

<sup>48</sup>CPT V. Bogdanov, "Vnimanie Serzhantam", Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 August 1978, p.1.

<sup>49</sup>Abashin, p.104.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., pp.104-105.

<sup>51</sup>Marshal of Engineer Troops V. Kharchenko, "Podgotovke Serzhantov-Postoyannoye Vnimanie", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 11 (1974), pp.6-10.

<sup>52</sup>Aksenov, p.37.

<sup>53</sup>Guards COL N. Madudov, "Opirayas' Na Serzhantov", Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 August 1978, p.2.

<sup>54</sup>COL GEN G. Salmanov, "Uluchshat' Podgotovku Serzhantov", Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 8 (1976), p.3.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p.4.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p.6.

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